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Abstract 
This article examines how Cuban-based firms and entrepreneurs circumvented ever- increasing risks 
in the illegal slave trade. The article sheds light to this question by analyzing new qualitative 
information of 65 Cuban-based firms against the Slavevoyages database. Our findings indicate that 
Cuban-based firms were entrepreneurial as they exploited the opportunities arising from the volatility 
of the slave trade by: (a) internalizing networks of agents which allowed the rapid diffusion of 
information, (b) diversifying trading goods and expanding the number of partnerships to reduce 
transaction costs and risk, (c) adopting technological innovations that modified the design and use of 
vessels.  
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Introduction 
Until the early nineteenth century, the slave trade to Cuba was carried out to a large extent by 
European and American firms and individuals. The abolition of the slave trade in the British 
colonies and the subsequent policing of the Atlantic from 1808 by the British navy had a 
profound effect on the slave traders and their modus operandi. These changes in the Atlantic 
basin led Cuban-based entrepreneurs to get directly involved in the transatlantic slave trade. 
This involvement often came in the form of trade partnerships and the creation of new firms, 
and was neither easy nor straightforward. This article first examines the operational changes 
implemented by these Cuban-based entrepreneurs, subsequently focusing on the innovative 
strategies instigated by them, particularly from the 1830s onwards. Entrepreneurship is 
defined here as a vital function of economic agents who Ôspecialize in collecting information 
that permits them to make judgmental decisions about innovation.Õ1 This view recognizes the 
volatile character of market environments, which constantly produce new business 
opportunities while simultaneously rendering some previous models obsolete.2 In 
environments like these, entrepreneurs as the ones at the center of this study, make decisions 
about innovation strategies, and exploit the most promising of these new opportunities.3 
Finally, this article argues that it was thanks to the flexibility in their operations, and to their 
innovative strategies, that Cuban-based entrepreneurs were able to make enormous profits 
until the very end of the epoch of transatlantic slave trade.  
The success of the Cuban-based firms and individuals in the slave trade business 
during the illegal period was of pivotal importance for the economic growth of Cuba at the 
time, and it coincided with the rise of the Second Slavery period.4 Sugar was one of the most 
demanded trading products in international markets at the time. Based on increasingly larger 
annual imports of African slaves Cuba became, during the first half of the nineteenth century, 
the main producer and exporter of sugar at international level.5 Ultimately, Cuban-based 
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merchants and planters saw the continuation of the slave trade as a sine qua non condition for 
the survival of their business and the economic prosperity of the island. To keep up with the 
international marketsÕ demands, they did not hesitate in investing heavily in what was by all 
standards a bourgeoning criminal activity, the transatlantic slave trade. 
To date, no systematic archival research exists which addresses the question of how 
these Cuban-based merchants and planters, without any knowledge and capabilities of the 
slave trade, managed to catch-up with their European and Brazilian competitors and to 
overcome the difficulties associated with the illegal nature of the trade, in order to then 
dominate it.6 This article builds on archival research carried out in Cuba, Spain, Brazil and 
Great Britain. It also incorporates theoretical insights from the economics of innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and diversification literatures to prove that it was due to the creation of a 
large network of agents, the adoption of diversification and risk-management strategies, and 
the introduction of technological innovations that Cuban-based firms were able to increase 
their flexibility, to overcome their lack of know-how, and to be successful in this trade, all 
this in spite of the illegal character of the transatlantic slave trade in the Spanish Atlantic after 
1820.  
Although the involvement of Cuban-based firms and individuals in the slave trade 
was, first and foremost a criminal activity, in this article they are studied as business 
endeavors, as this approach better reflects their character and nature, and also allows for a 
more in-depth analysis of their impact. This article avoids taking a moral perspective, but 
acknowledges that the people and activities presented and discussed in the following pages 
developed a heinous business that had a deep impact on the societies where they procured 
their slaves, and on the lives of those men, women, and children they carried out across the 
Atlantic to satisfy their needs for free labor.   
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Adapting to changing market conditions: the rise of Cuban-based firms 
Until the early 1790s the Cuban slave trade was in the hands of foreign traders, companies, 
and occasionally governments. The Spanish policy of granting monopolistic privileges to 
these foreign traders and conglomerates was effective enough to supply Cuban cities and 
countryside with sufficient numbers of African slaves, until the revolution in the neighboring 
French colony of Saint Domingue brought about a dramatic change in the trade.7 The 
collapse of sugar production in Saint Domingue presented Cuban planters with the unique 
opportunity of replacing their French competitors as the main producers and exporters of 
sugar and coffee for the international markets, something they achieved incrementally from 
the mid-1790s onwards. When the rights granted by the Spanish Crown to the Liverpudlian 
firm of Baker & Dawson came to an end in 1788, Cuban patrician elites, led by Francisco de 
Arango y Parreo, started to lobby the King of Spain for new privileges to import slaves from 
Africa in ever-larger numbers. By 1803, these demands included for the first time a 
pioneering request for the monarch to authorize them to form a Sociedad Annima (Limited 
Company) that would allow them to reduce their dependence on foreign merchants by 
establishing a transatlantic slave trading business with its epicenter in Havana, and which 
they thought could lead to a free-market environment.8 
 As David Murray has argued, Ôit is generally agreed that Cuban pressure was 
responsible for the experiment which changed the nature of the slave trade to Spanish 
America, from a closed commerce operated by monopolies, to a trade open to Spaniards and 
foreigners alike.Õ9 Although already in 1789 they had been authorized to import slaves from 
Africa by themselves, it was not until the early nineteenth century that their involvement and 
initiative led to a significant change in the dynamics of this trade to Cuba.10 The 1803 petition 
to set up a Limited African Company in Havana for the sole purpose of taking full command 
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of the slave trading operations in the coast of Africa constituted a clear sign that a new age of 
free trade had dawned.  
 This proposal, signed by some of the most notorious future slave traders of Havana 
and by many members of the commercial and political elites of the island, recommended to 
learn the tricks of the trade from the British. Such an approach was mainly the result of their 
lack of know-how, as Cuban individuals and firms had very little experience operating in the 
slave trade. The proposal also suggested sending vessels to two or three appropriate places 
along the African coast, where they would function as factories that would store and provide 
the items needed for the trade, and, presumably, the slaves themselves. These Ôfloating 
factoriesÕ would, according to the subscribers, constitute the Ôpractical schoolÕ where their 
youth could acquire the necessary knowledge to carry out this trade in the years and decades 
to come.11 
 Although the proposal for the creation of this African Company was a complete 
failure, most of those who had bought actions in it were still able to become leading slave 
merchants in the years to come. For example, the firm of Cuesta Manzanal & Brother 
continued to import Africans to Cuba until at least the late 1830s, and the Gonzlez Larrinaga 
family did something similar. Their fortunes were eventually merged when both families 
were linked through a marriage in the early part of the century.12 Their connections to another 
key slave trading family, the Prez de Urria, were strengthened in the 1830s, also through 
marriage.13 Others would soon join them, and among these emerging new firms and 
individuals were some of the most notorious Atlantic slave traders of the nineteenth century, 
including Pedro Forade, the Zangroniz brothers, Pedro Blanco, and Joaqun Gmez.14      
 Even before 1803, Cuban-based entrepreneurs, including some of those mentioned 
above, had began to retrieve the actual trade from foreign hands.15 Already since 1792 they 
had succeeded in sending slave-trading expeditions to Africa, when the frigate Cometa
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owned by Sebastian de Lasa, successfully brought 227 African slaves to Havana.16 Slowly 
but steadily they started fitting more and more slave vessels and sending them directly to the 
coast of Africa, effectively breaking down the traditional triangular trade that had been 
typical during the eighteenth century.17  
This rise of the Cuban-based firms underlined the early signs of a tentative 
relationship between the expansion of the slave trade and slavery and the rise of modern 
capitalism, whereby government-supported monopolies were replaced by an increasing 
number of entrepreneurial individuals and firms.18 The cooperative essence of this trade Ð
often developed around family or paisanaje bonds Ð was apparent as early as 1831, when 28 
of HavanaÕs slave trading firms and individuals wrote to the King asking for more privileges 
with regards to the trade. Among the signatories were the houses of Zangroniz Brothers & 
Co., Pi & Co., Cuesta Manzanal & Brother, and Pablo Sam, Joaqun Madn, and Juan 
Madrazo, all leading slave traders in the Atlantic at the time.19 In a letter sent to the Foreign 
Office four years later, British Consul in Havana Charles Tolm confirmed the extent of this 
cooperation within the city, when he commented that both Peninsulares and Creoles were 
heavily investing in the slave trade, adding that among them were Ôplanters, merchants, 
shopkeepers, lawyers, physicians, clerks, mechanics [and] in truth, people of every 
denomination.Õ20 
   
Operational changes in the characteristics of the slave trade from 1820 onwards 
The new environment that was created as a result of British abolitionist pressures across the 
Atlantic basin constituted the first major challenge to these newly formed Cuban-based 
firms.21 Reducing the risks associated with the slave trade required learning the ropes of a 
new business, which implied Ð in the first instance Ð acquiring the know-how of the trade so 
as to reduce the increased risks.22 Very dissimilar but intensely interconnected issues and 
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abilities had to be learned and honed at a fast pace. Among them were what provisions were 
needed for the transatlantic voyage and where they could be found, how the actual operations 
and negotiations in the coast of Africa were to be conducted, and what items of trade were 
more likely to be accepted by the slave suppliers there, etc.23   
Since they had been unable to open offices in London or Liverpool as they had 
originally planned, their access to financial and trade-related know-how was restricted. 
Furthermore, and in spite of the increasing complications that the illegal trade brought to their 
businesses, competition and cooperation intensified as the profits to be made still attracted a 
considerable number of foreign traders into this commerce.  
Simultaneously the main characteristics of the slave trade were significantly modified 
at various points after 1820, and particularly after 1835. Slave traders changed their modus 
operandi as they had to adapt to the new illicit character of the business. Specifically, while 
before they traded in open day light and had the necessary time to ensure that their human 
cargo was in perfect physical condition, now they were forced to implement their trafficking 
operations whilst often finding ways of hiding away from the anti-slave trade patrols. In 
Africa, slave factories that were previously open for all to be found with ease were soon 
moved into the interior. These measures were taken virtually everywhere from the Upper 
Guinea coast to Angola, in order to avoid being seen by the anti-slave trade patrols. In the 
cases of the Upper Guinea coast (rivers Pongo, Gallinas, Sestos, etc.), slave-trading agents 
had their factories inland by these rivers, where the British were often unable to reach them. 
The same happened in the river Congo, where the river port of Boma (or as it was often 
referred to, Embomma) gained importance after the British began patrolling of the area in the 
late 1810s.24  
The newly formed firms learned rapidly how to operate in this business and how to 
adjust to change by employing a trial-and-error method. A typical example of acquisition of 
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know-how during this period was given by Theodore Canot, a minor but well-known slave 
trader who was active in the 1820s and 1830s. In his first journey to Upper Guinea, just 
before establishing himself there as an agent for Cuban- and Puerto Rican-based merchants, 
Canot found how terribly mistaken he had been by carrying a large cargo of Ôuseless tobaccoÕ 
from Havana as a bartering item to trade for slaves.25 As a matter of fact, Canot described his 
adventure in trying to turn his cargo into any sort of item that could be traded for slaves along 
the coast. Eventually, he was forced to rely on an English businessman who sent his tobacco 
to Freetown where a ÔHebrew friendÕ graciously exchanged it for Manchester fabrics, which 
were readily accepted by those trading human beings at River Pongo.26   
Conducting business in Africa depended to a large extent on having contacts with 
local rulers and veteran slave trade agents, but after the mid-1810s was contingent on the 
abilities of agents and slave shipmasters to avoid falling into the hands of British patrols. 
These new circumstances led ship owners to instruct the men they put in charge of the 
transatlantic voyages to follow strict operational routines in order to avoid being spotted and 
captured by anti-slave trade cruisers.27 These operational routines were so astute that by 1843 
the Mixed Commission judges in Havana wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen noting that these 
activities were almost impossible to track down. In their own words there was Ôso much 
mystery, and so many devices adopted to cover their designs, that it is impossible for us to 
learn sufficiently of their proceedings, to enable us satisfactorily to report them.Õ28  
After the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1835 was signed, using foreign flags belonging to 
countries with which the British had not signed common abolition treaties was another 
efficient way to avoid capture. Notable among those were the American flag, and for a while 
in the late 1830s the Portuguese flag. The use of these flags was frequently supported by the 
American and Portuguese consuls in Havana, Salvador de Bahia, Lisbon, Cdiz, and other 
ports where the ships could obtain legal papers to undertake their journeys to Africa. The 
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American consul in Havana, Nicholas P. Trist, was heavily involved in this sort of murky 
deal especially after 1835, to the point that the US Government was forced to open an 
enquiry into his actions in Cuba, after a number of American vessel captains met in New 
York in August 1839 to discuss his inadmissible behavior, and in particular his involvement 
in the slave trade.29 Even more notorious was the support lent to the slave trade by the 
Portuguese consul in Havana, Jos Miguel Fernndez who was himself considered to be one 
of the most prominent slave traders in the port before his appointment in the mid-1830s.30  
In addition to this cunning new modus operandi, Cuban-based entrepreneurs were 
quite successful at liaising with the Spanish authorities, who more often than not rushed to 
cover up their tracks and received substantial cuts from the profits as a reward. One of the 
Cuban governors of the period, Francisco Dionisio Vives (1823-32) stated in unequivocal 
terms that he had and would always protect the slave traders, because it was thanks to them 
that the prosperity of the island, based on the production of sugar and coffee, was possible.31 
Another governor of this period, Miguel Tacn (1834-38) commented years after leaving his 
post that after 1835 the traffic rather than diminishing, as the British had expected, increased, 
thanks to the protection that the authorities, including himself, had offered to the slave trading 
entrepreneurs based on the Cuban capital.32  
Many other officers, from governors down to local authorities, connived with slave 
traders until the very end of the slave trade. After Captain General Jernimo Valds (1841-
43) dared to confront the slave traders upon his arrival in Havana, British Mixed Commission 
judges James Kennedy and Campbell Dalrymple went as far as denouncing in detail that 
while he had refused to take any bribes from the traders, his predecessors had traditionally 
accepted around two hundred doubloons per every landed cargo in the previous decades.33 
Kennedy and Dalrymple also insisted that although Valds had refused these bribes, minor 
officers across the island continued to accept payoffs of at least one hundred doubloons per 
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landed cargo.34 Even as late as in 1859, British consul and Mixed Commission judge Joseph 
T. Crawford was forced to denounce what he referred to as Ôthe most glaring corruption of 
the local authoritiesÕ in relation to the many illegal fittings and landing of slave trade 
expeditions in the island under the neglectful eyes of the islandÕs authorities.35 
Overall, the end of the legal slave trade constituted a unique opportunity for Cuban-
based entrepreneurs to enter this profitable business. However, these newly formed firms 
were faced with two fundamental challenges: (1) they had to acquire the relevant knowledge 
and know-how, which was often tacit and protected through secrecy due to the illegal nature 
of the trade; and (2) they had to rapidly adapt their modus operandi so as to maneuver under 
the new obstacles imposed by the illegal nature of the trade. 
 
Cuban-based firmsÕ strategies 
In addition to the operational changes discussed above, Cuban-based firms were 
entrepreneurial as they were able to exploit the new opportunities arising from the volatility 
of the slave trade by focusing on three main strategies: (a) the internalization of networks of 
agents which allowed the rapid diffusion of information; (b) the diversification of trading 
items and expansion of the number of partnerships to reduce risk; and (c) the adoption of 
technological innovations in the design and use of new vessels that were more appropriate for 
the transformed nature of the slave trade, as the years went by and the British introduced their 
own innovations and modifications to their vessels.  
 
(a) Internalized Network of Agents 
Between 1809 and 1815 Ôthe Cuban slave trade became an almost exclusively Iberian 
trade.Õ36 One of their major breakthroughs was to set up factories and agents along the coast 
of Africa, from Upper Guinea in the North to the Angolan coast in the South. BritainÕs 
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decision in 1807 to prohibit the trade, coupled with the American and Danish prohibitions, 
accelerated the structural changes that the Napoleonic wars had forced on the Cuban slave 
trade. During the 1790s there had been two or three variants of the Cuban slave trade, as 
Herbert Klein has established: (a) a direct trade, carried out almost exclusively by foreign 
slave traders, which involved trading slaves directly from Africa to Cuba; (b) an indirect 
trade, which entailed trading slaves from Africa to a number of Caribbean islands or to an 
entrept like Jamaica from which the slaves were then transshipped to Cuba; and (c) a 
complex intra-Caribbean trade, which involved the shipment of slaves from one part of the 
Caribbean to another.37 
By the second decade of the nineteenth century, Cuban-based slave traders had begun 
to take full control of the direct African trade to the island, and by 1835 they were noticeably 
in charge of it. One of the main initial difficulties to overcome was their lack of contacts in 
the coast of Africa. In order to successfully insert themselves into this new business, they first 
relied on existing firms and agents that had continued to trade in African slaves even after the 
British abolition had come into effect. Two of the most notorious agents inherited by Cuban 
slave traders were John Ormond on the Upper Guinea coast and Francisco Felix de Souza in 
Whydah.38 Whilst for many years to come they continued to use the services of de Souza, 
who had almost total control over the trade in what was one of the main West African slave 
trading ports, Cuban-based entrepreneurs soon began sending their own men to the coast to 
learn the trade and often to act as their exclusive agents.  
During the legal period of the trade slave, merchants were mainly transacting with 
unaffiliated agents based in the ports of embarkation and dis-embarkation. Robin Pearson and 
David Richardson have demonstrated that personalized business networks were in decline in 
the British slave trade in the 1750-1807 period.39 Although PearsonÕs and RichardsonÕs 
argument is specific to the eighteenth-century British slave trade, and therefore cannot be 
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freely extrapolated and applied to slave trade trends as a whole, a careful scrutinizing of 
documents located in British, Spanish, Cuban, and Brazilian archives allow us to reveal that 
personalized networks were once more re-invigorated during the illicit period. After the slave 
trade became illegal, taking advantage of existing structures and patterns of trade, Cuban-
based entrepreneurs personalized transactions and developed a complex and rich network of 
their own agents, who were on occasion close relatives, friends, or paisanos, colleagues of a 
similar ethnic or national background. This was a result of the fact that the unlawful nature of 
the trade increased transaction costs, namely the costs of using the markets. Markets for 
information have inherent failures, and as ArrowÕs fundamental paradox of information 
underlines Ôits value to the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he 
has in effect acquired it without cost.Õ40 This is applicable to the use of independent agents by 
slave traders during the illegal period. As the risk for these agents increased considerably due 
to the persecution and prosecution of slave traders, their incentives to behave 
opportunistically increased as well. In particular, after 1820 transactions between unaffiliated 
agents and Cuban-based slave traders began to decline, as once the agents would reveal vital 
information about the location or availability of slaves they held, the value of that 
information would decline as well as the willingness of the slave trader to pay for it.  
Cuban-based firms overcame the above problems by internalizing the market and 
creating an extensive and complex network of their own agents whenever and wherever 
possible.41 Besides reducing transaction costs, this agent network allowed them to build trust 
and to diffuse information rapidly. Social network theory underlines that when a firm is well-
embedded in its social network their performance improves.42 One reason for the better 
performance of well-embedded firms is the fact that the social network facilitates the transfer 
of knowledge and information. Empirical studies regarding social networks show that 
embedded relations within a network facilitate the circulation of Ôthicker informationÕ 
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regarding strategy and know-how.43 This process of knowledge-sharing thus promotes 
learning and innovation.44  
Rapid access to information was vital when the slave trade was prohibited because, 
among other reasons, it facilitated the selection of the right route for a safe return. The choice 
of the route was high among the priorities of slave ship owners and masters. As mentioned 
before, explicit instructions of what routes to follow were often found in the letters 
confiscated from slave vessels. It was well known that on both sides of the Atlantic British 
cruisers guarded these routes at least partially, which made the choices of the slave traders 
even more essential. To ensure a safe return, Cuban-based slave trading firms usually posted 
agents in strategically important points such as Rocky Key, Crocodile, French Key, and the 
Isle of Pines to help the arriving expeditions from Africa. Having committed agents in 
important landing spots was also crucial. Lists with the names of these partners often appear 
in this correspondence as well.45    
Archival research reveals the extensive network of agents built by the most important 
Cuban-based entrepreneurs. For example, the Zangroniz brothers & Co. sent one of their own 
Ð Juan Jos Zangroniz Jr. Ð to work alongside de Souza in Whydah, and they also endeavored 
to create an extensive network that included agents Vicente Paulo e Silva in Salvador de 
Bahia, and Antonio Sanmart in Lagos, among others.46 In the Upper Guinea coast, after the 
suicide of Ormond in 1833, Mlaga-born merchant Pedro Blanco and French sailor turned-
into-slave dealer Theodore Canot, among others, established themselves as agents of the 
Cuban-based trading firms in this area. BlancoÕs company, formed alongside Lino Carballo, 
became one of the most successful during the period.47 Equally, Havana business firms like 
that of Pedro Forade & Co. had their own agents working in the Congo basin. Forade was 
described by Mixed Commission judge Kennedy in 1853 as Ôthe greatest slave dealer of the 
present day.Õ48 Since the mid-1830s he had had an agent in the river Congo named Alphonse 
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Meynier, who was said to have been in business there from the late 1820s and, according to 
Captain John Matson who visited his slave factory, was still active in the late 1840s.49   
 Other agents working for the Cuban-based slave traders at the time were Flix Cosme 
Madail in Popo, Jos Cotta and Jos Mora in Lagos, Jos H. çlvarez Simidel, çngel 
Ximnez, and Jos Mara Prez in Gallinas, a Mr. Gamboa and Jacinto Saavedra in the river 
Congo, and Xoaqun Franque and Catalonian trader Pedro Manegat in Cabinda. Manegat 
eventually relocated to Havana, where he became a leading slave merchant in the years to 
come, taking advantage of the contacts he had left behind in West Central Africa, and joining 
forces in his enslaving initiatives with another important Catalan merchant resident in 
Havana, and former slave vessel captain, Jacinto Llobet.50  
 The operations described in this article are but a fraction of a very complex history of 
entrepreneurial strategies adopted by Cuban-based slave trading firms in the nineteenth 
century. Once they were able to dispense with former agents and put their own personnel in 
place, the efficiency of their operations, and by extension their profits, increased 
significantly, to the point that some of them like Pedro Blanco and Lino Carballo, Jos 
Mazorra, Joaqun Gmez, and various members of the Zulueta clan eventually became 
substantially rich individuals. However, the risk of losing all this wealth was never too far 
away, as the well-documented case of Blanco & Carballo, whose firm went bankrupt in 1848, 
demonstrates.51  
The strategies of the Cuban-based entrepreneurs, when it came to establishing 
networks of agents did not always follow similar paths. Some of them, notoriously those of 
Blanco & Carballo, and the Zangroniz brothers sent one of their main shareholders to the 
African coast to take the business into their own hands. In the case of the Zangroniz brothers, 
it was precisely one of the two brothers who settled down in Whydah, becoming one of the 
main traders there, second only to Francisco Felix de Souza.52 In the case of Blanco & 
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Carballo, it was Pedro Blanco himself who moved to the river Gallinas setting up one of the 
most infamous slave trading factories of the period. In other cases, Europeans Ð and often 
Spaniards Ð living already in the African coast were hired to supply the Cuban firms with 
slaves. Many of the Cuban-based firms opted for this method, including those of the Cuesta 
Manzanal & Brother, Pedro Martnez & Co., and Abazurza & Azopardo, among others.53 
 Widening their networks, many of these firms were keen to have agents in various 
key locations across the Atlantic, from Salvador de Bahia in Brazil to Santander, Mlaga, and 
Barcelona. Particularly important was to have recognized agents in various Caribbean sites 
where impromptu slave landings could take place. Puerto Rico and the island of St Thomas, 
for example, counted with several men with business links to the Cuban-based slave traders, 
and along the Cuban coast a large number of planters acted as emergency contacts in case of 
landings within their jurisdictions.54   
For many years, particularly in the 1835-45 period, some of these firms had active 
agents even in Freetown, Sierra Leone, where their duties were mainly related to gathering 
intelligence about the movements of the West African squadron, and to buying slave vessels 
adjudicated and auctioned by the Mixed Commission courts there. Blanco & Carballo, for 
example, had an agent there for these purposes named Vicente Snchez, who often passed 
important news along to Pedro Blanco in Gallinas and who also bought some of these vessels 
to re-engage them in the slave trade.55 Equally, Pedro Juan de Zulueta counted with the 
services of British merchant George Alexander Kidd, who was in charge of re-acquiring 
vessels auctioned by the Mixed Commission courts there.56  
 
(b) Diversification and Risk-Management Stratagems  
From the very early years of direct Cuban involvement in the slave trade, a phenomenon that 
was clearly observable was that of the diversification of business operations. This was a 
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process that at least at the beginning went both ways, consequently fueling the rise of the 
Second Slavery in the island. At that time some important foreign slave traders bought lands, 
often already established plantations, in the Cuban countryside, while Cuban and Spanish 
plantation owners invested for the first time in the now promising business of the slave trade.  
 Diversification may sometimes be inspired by the benefits resulting from economies 
of scope, which arise when fixed capital is indivisible.57 In the case of the slave trade, the cost 
of any given voyage was fixed, as it was independent of the quantity of slaves that would be 
transported. As the quantity of slaves varied greatly due to the increased uncertainties 
associated with the unlawful nature of the trade, diversification was a strategy that many 
Cuban-based entrepreneurs pursued so as to reduce risk. Specifically, Cuban-based firms 
diversified in trading other products such as palm oil, ivory, hides, and salt. Additionally, 
they also diversified by investing in human trafficking of Spanish migrants, free laborers 
from Africa, and Chinese indentured workers, or by resorting to acts of piracy.58 
Among those involved in the slave trade who diversified their investment and bought 
Cuban real estate were some notable entrepreneurs like Liverpudlian merchant Patrick Welsh, 
who owned vast lands in the valley of Guamacaro until his death in the late 1810s, and 
renowned American slave traders Zachary Atkins and Nat Howland, who settled down and 
opened financial houses in Matanzas in the first years of the nineteenth century.59 Equally, 
among those who signed the 1803 petition to the King to set up a limited Company and to 
establish slave factories in Africa were some of the most important landowners in Cuba at the 
time. Chiefly among them were Francisco de Arango y Parreo who owned a number of rural 
estates including the sugar plantation La Ninfa; Bernab Martnez de Pinillos, who owned at 
least two sugar mills west of Havana; and the counts of Jaruco and Casa Bayona, whose 
families had owned numerous plantations in Cuba since the seventeenth century.60 Over the 
following years the fusion of the ownership of plantations and slave vessels grew closer and 
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stronger. In the aforementioned letter sent to the King signed by a large number of Cuban-
based slave traders in 1831, many of the signatories were both slave traders and plantation 
owners.61  
In the aftermath of the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1835, the Palmerston Act of 1839, 
and the Aberdeen Act of 1845, Cuban-based slave traders Ð at least for a while Ð began to 
harbor real fears that the British intentions to bring the slave trade to an end were more 
serious than ever. While some of them went out of business altogether, others increasingly 
focused their energies on new ways of carrying out the trade and on diversifying their 
business. Among the new strategies adopted after the 1835 treaty came into existence, were 
the use of separate vessels to send trade goods to Africa. These vessels were normally under 
the American flag, making it almost impossible for the British cruisers to stop and search 
them.  
Equally, they resorted to risk-management strategies such as part-ownership ventures 
and expansion in the number of partners, which allowed them to disperse their investment in 
the slave trade across many different vessels in any given year.62 Whilst in the late eighteenth 
century it had been common for merchants, notably London-based Atlantic merchants, to 
form partnerships with two or three individuals, due to the increased risks associated with the 
illegal nature of the post-1820 slave trade, Cuban-based entrepreneurs usually established 
partnerships with up to twenty or more partners.63 To some extent, their behavior echoed that 
of the Liverpool merchants in the last years of the legal slave trade, who also endeavored to 
expand their partnerships, although to a smaller number than Cuban-based entrepreneurs, so 
as to reduce risks.64 At the time, many of these business partnerships were open-ended and 
informal, so that any merchant could be a partner in various different ventures.    
In Cuba, these part-ownership ventures had proliferated to such an extent already in 
the early 1830s, that British officers based in Havana were forced to mention and discuss 
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them in several opportunities. Already in 1830, in what it was a bad season for slave traders 
due to a combination of effective British patrolling and high mortality in the Middle Passage, 
they referred to the general state of bankruptcy that had Ôtaken place among the shopkeepers 
of the Havana,Õ which they attributed to Ôtheir obstinate gambling in the slave trade.Õ65 A few 
years later, in 1835, Consul Tolm went even further by stating that Ôa great many, perhaps 
the majority of the partiesÕ investing in slave trading ventures were Ôshare holders.Õ66 He then 
went on to describe a routine slave trading operation: 
 
A clever Captain well known in the Traffic unites with two or three friends to 
commence an expedition, a ship is bought, her cargo is prepared, meanwhile the 
number of the interested is increasing and at last, when all is ready there may prove to 
be twenty partners, some having shares of eight or ten thousand dollars and others of 
only one thousand dollars.67 
 
Finally, a new insurance company, the Compaa de Seguros Martimos de la Habana, was 
created in Havana for the specific task of insuring slave expeditions to Africa. Although, 
insurance companies had been covering slave trade voyages for years, this new company, 
created in the mid-1830s under the auspices of Basque entrepreneur Jos Manuel Urzanqui, 
was said to have covered several vessels and to have made a profit of a 24 percent in its first 
few months of existence.68   
While for some part-ownership ventures and new investment in the palm oil, ivory, 
hides, and salt trades from West Africa were feasible alternatives that could help soothe the 
impact of the British policing in the Atlantic, for others human trafficking continued to be at 
the center of their business models. Poor Spanish migrants, mostly from the Canary Islands 
and Galicia were considered as like for like replacements for plantation-bound African 
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slaves. Various white colonization projects presented between 1842 and 1845 to the 
Government by leading Cuban patricians with interests in the slave trade, including those of 
Jos Mara Calvo, Domingo Goicura, the Count of Jaruco, and the firm of Zulueta & 
Company, all had this idea at their core.69  
The need to replace African slaves also led some of these firms and traders to attempt 
new ingenious avenues to import Africans, this time under the euphemistic labels of free 
colonists or free laborers. The likes of the Zangroniz brothers, Manuel Basilio Cunha Reis, 
and Jos Surez Argudn, were among the first to promote this new business scheme.70 
Importing ÔvoluntaryÕ African workers was, obviously, a venture fraught with problems, as 
the British Mixed Commission judges based in Havana rightly pointed out, not least because 
their promoters were all adventurers Ôconnected with the Slave Trade, who perceived thereby 
a means of moneymaking by carrying on the Traffic.Õ71  
Another human trade that blossomed from the late 1840s and that was chiefly carried 
out by active slave traders was that of Chinese indentured workers. Among those who 
committed vast amounts of money to this new business were the firms of Zulueta & 
Company, and that of the Zangroniz brothers. The Zuluetas, Julin and Pedro in particular, 
became the main importers of Chinese ÔvoluntaryÕ workers from that moment onward. They 
were the first ones to bring a shipment of Chinese laborers to Cuba in 1847 working in 
tandem with the Cuban Real Junta de Fomento. As they had done before with their agents in 
Africa, Cuban-based Chinese traders started their new Asian venture relying on already 
existing agents based in Manila and Xiamen, but by the mid-1850s they had replaced them 
with their own men; a circumstance that allowed them to make even larger profits.72  
Equally and almost simultaneously, in the 1850s Cuban-based slave traders saw an 
opportunity in importing colonists from neighboring Yucatn. Many of the leading slavers of 
the time, including Domingo Goicura and the Zangroniz brothers, agreed trading contracts 
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with Mexican authorities that went as far as to allow for the import of not only willing 
laborers but also war prisoners from the Caste Wars that were underway in the Yucatn 
peninsula at the time.73 
Above all, however, slave traders diversified by continuing their investments in sugar, 
as they had done since the 1790s.74 Already in the mid-nineteenth century many of them had 
purchased their own sugar plantations. By then Pedro Forade owned the Porvenir sugar 
plantation near the town of Coln; Salvador Martiartu owned the Achuri and the Arratia 
estates; and the Zulueta clan, now blended with another leading slave trading family, the 
Sam, owned several of the largest and most technologically innovative sugar plantations not 
only in Cuba, but in the world. Renowned among them were the çlava, the Espaa, and the 
Vizcaya.75 By diversifying in so many ways, many of these leading slave trading firms and 
individuals were also able to survive the end of the slave trade and to consolidate their 
fortunes by expanding their businesses across the Atlantic world. 
 
(c) Introduction of Technological Innovations 
By the 1840s the pursuing of slave traders by the Royal Navy in Africa, the Atlantic, and the 
Caribbean meant that the slave trade had become an increasingly risky commerce. While 
many slave traders, like the firms of Busto & Incln, and Blanco & Carballo had gone out of 
business, those that still managed to carry on with the traffic had to change their strategies yet 
again.76 To all the stratagems discussed previously in this article, from the early 1830s to the 
late 1840s, a new one, based on new technological advances related to shipbuilding was 
added. According to Schumpeter, shocks give rise to disequilibrium in the markets.77 
Entrepreneurs who exploit these discontinuities through technological innovation destroy the 
competitive advantage of existing firms and prosper. This creative destruction rather than 
price competition was a prevalent force in the slave trade after 1820. 
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From the late 1820s, US-built vessels became extremely popular among Cuban-based 
slave traders.78 While large heavily armed ships continued to be used, new small fast-sailing 
vessels were in high demand.79 According to the figures presented by the Slavevoyages 
database, in the 1835-1850 period the average tonnage of vessels used in the slave trade was 
of 152.5 tons; a very different figure from the following period (1851-66) where the average 
was 234.0 tons and during which larger, merchant-looking ships were used.80 American 
ships, usually clippers built in Baltimore, were employed with increasing frequency by the 
most notorious slave traders of that period, although vessels built in other places like 
Barcelona and Havana continued to be used as well.81 These ships were endowed with a 
series of features that made them attractive to those involved in the illicit trade of human 
beings across the Atlantic. The design of the now-famous Baltimore clipper was influenced 
by the demands of the slave traders. This relationship may have pre-dated the epoch in which 
several of these vessels made their way to Havana to be employed in the slave trade. Ship-
builders in Baltimore had been hit hard by the war of 1812, and in its aftermath some appear 
to have moved to Havana to build slave ships there.82 
Among the results obtained by the new technological innovations incorporated on the 
ships that were used for the slave trade from the mid-1830s until the late 1840s, two were 
particularly important: lightness and speed. In a missive sent by the Havana Mixed 
Commission judges to British admiral Halkett in late 1836, they commented that: 
 
( ... ) the Slave Traders in Havana are now adopting a new system for carrying on 
their nefarious traffic, by employing Baltimore schooners of from 50 to 120 tons. 
These vessels are of the lightest possible description of build ( É ) they are for the 
most part unarmed, their intention being now to trust entirely to speed83 
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The first new feature, lightness, was directly related to the new conditions in which the slave 
trade was being carried out on both sides of the Atlantic. Light vessels were able to penetrate 
deeper into the interior of the African rivers and waterways, thus allowing them to conduct 
their business away from the coast where anti-slave trade cruisers lurked constantly. On the 
Cuban side of the ocean, light ships could get closer to specific points of landing, that were 
frequently located in shallow waters (i.e. the infamously popular landing spots of Canmar 
and Majana in the gulf of Bataban were two clear examples). All in all, lighter, smaller 
vessels were also less likely to be spotted by the anti-slave trade patrols. As Captain Matson 
himself pointed out in the mid-1840s, small vessels had smaller topsails, and were more 
likely to spot the British cruisersÕ topsails before they could see them, thus facilitating their 
escape.84 According to British commissioners Edward Schenley and Richard Robert Madden, 
the main reason behind the adoption of smaller vessels was a new strategy devised by the 
slave traders to leave the coast of Africa in squadrons of three or four ships, so that if they 
were to encounter Ôa man-of-war, one is to be sacrificed to secure the safety of the others.Õ85 
The other main characteristic of these Baltimore-built clippers was speed. In order to 
build tailor-made ships for the slave trade, such as the ones requested by the Cuban-based 
entrepreneurs, a number of modifications were made to these new vessels. Chief among them 
was the aforementioned lowering of the height of their topsails, as well as a redistribution of 
the weight towards the front of the ship. Weapons were dispensed of, since now slave trade 
captains would rely mostly on speed and camouflage to avoid anti-slave trade cruisers. These 
vessels were built to last only three or four voyages, a circumstance that allowed their owners 
to sacrifice them on occasion without incurring massive losses.86 It is little wonder that the 
British Mixed Commission judges in Havana commented on multiple occasions that these 
vessels were Ôadmirably adapted for escaping from and deceiving His MajestyÕs cruizers 
[sic].Õ87 
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Another alteration that allowed for the construction and use of smaller ships in the 
transatlantic slave trade was the optimization of the space existing to hold the slaves after 
their purchase had taken effect in Africa. Portable coppers, irons, etc., became customary, 
allowing the slavers, who were constantly ready to escape and deceive, to throw all 
compromising items overboard in the event of being discovered and captured, allowing for a 
faster escape. Equally, not having heavy weaponry on board had a similar effect whenever 
they were chased by anti-slave trade cruisers. All in all, the adoption of state-of-the-art 
technologies gave Cuban-based slave traders an indisputable advantage, not only over those 
who were not able to adapt and compete, but also with respect to the success of their ultimate 
raison dÕetre, that of carrying as many men, women, and children across the Atlantic as they 
possibly could. 
Eventually, in what was another moment of adaptation in the early 1850s, after the 
introduction of steamers, slave traders began using larger merchant vessels, which allowed 
them to carry much larger numbers of African slaves per voyage.88 Although the British 
Navy eventually also introduced a number of steamers to patrol the waters of the island of 
Cuba, these steamers were frequently in need of repair and spent long periods in the arsenal 
of Havana, a circumstance that did not escape the eyes and ears of Havana-based slave 
traders, whose investments grew larger and larger during these years.89 By the end of the 
decade, all British patrolling of the Cuban coastline was de facto terminated, further 
encouraging the fitting of large vessels and the chances of success of these large slave-trading 
expeditions.90 
 
Conclusions 
This article has brought to light a series of important aspects related to the adaptation to 
changing market conditions and their relationship with the emerging modern capitalism in the 
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nineteenth-century Atlantic World, by examining the operational changes and innovative 
strategies introduced by Cuban-based entrepreneurs involved in the transatlantic slave trade. 
It has highlighted that it was mainly due to the decisions and capabilities of these 
entrepreneurs to adapt and innovate in a riskier and volatile business environment that they 
were able to gain a competitive advantage in the slave trade across the Atlantic. This, in turn, 
served the booming of the Cuban sugar industry, and contributed to the perpetuation of the 
inhuman trafficking and bondage of African men, women and children for several decades. 
Our most significant findings point to the fact that to do so, the Cuban-based firms 
were forced: a) to learn the secrets of the existing slave trade through trial and error; and b) 
furthermore, to develop new skills and capabilities, which transformed them into successful 
entrepreneurs in spite of constant British surveillance. Specifically, their success was based 
on the following three strategies: a) the fostering of an extensive and personalized network of 
agents; b) the reduction of their risks through diversification and risk-management, and; c) 
the introduction of technological innovations into their business operations.  
When the abolition of the slave trade by the British and their allies disrupted the 
regular operations of the slave trade, many existing firms exited the slave trade due to the 
increased risks and losses. Yet, newly formed Cuban-based entrepreneurs exploited this 
Schumpeterian shock in the slave trade to strengthen their competitive advantage; a 
competitive advantage that was based on rapid diffusion of information through their 
internalized networks of agents in the Atlantic, as well as through diversification, risk-
management, and technological innovation. It was precisely due to the combination of these 
entrepreneurial endeavors that capture rates of slave vessels remained about the same after 
1835 as they had been before, extending the calamitous transatlantic slave trade for another 
generation.91  
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negroes in Cuba.Õ There were also similar requests made by Manuel Basilio Cunha Reis and 
Ramn Mandillo. AHN: Ultramar, 90/14.   
71 Her MajestyÕs Commissioners to the Earl of Clarendon. Havana, 15 May 1856. HCPP. 
1857 Session 2 [2281] Class A. Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra 
Leone, Havana, the Cape of Good Hope, and Loanda; and reports from British naval officers, 
relating to the slave trade. 
72 Yun, The Coolie Speaks, p. 15; and Lopez, Chinese Cubans, pp. 19-22. See also Eltis, Free 
and Coerced Transatlantic Migrations,Õ p. 261. 
73 See among others: Rugeley, YucatnÕs Maya; and Reed, The Caste War of Yucatan. For the 
Zangroniz and Goicura deals with the Mexican government see: Mr Doyle to the Earl of 
Clarendon. Mexico, 5 February 1855. HCPP: 1854-55 (0.4) Class B. Correspondence with 
British ministers and agents in foreign countries, and with foreign ministers in England, 
relating to the slave trade, ffs. 287-8; and Joseph T. Crawford to Captain General Jos de la 
Concha. Havana, 15 April 1858. HCPP. 859 Session 2 [2569-I] Class B. Correspondence 
with British ministers and agents in foreign countries, and with foreign ministers in England, 
relating to the slave trade, ffs. 160-1. 
74 As we saw before, this process went both ways, and also leading sugar planters invested on 
the slave trade, also from the 1790s. 
75 See Perret Ballester, El azcar en Matanzas, pp. 390-439.  
76 The Palmerston Act of 1839 caused great disturbances among Cuban-based slave trading 
firms and individuals. Some of them, as Pedro Blanco, went as far as to abandoning their 
West African factories and moving to Cuba or Spain. The use of existing Courts of Vice-
Admiralty to judge slave-trading vessels carrying Portuguese flags, and the destructions of 
slave factories in the Upper Guinea and Ambriz in 1842, also contributed to a slowdown of 
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business until circumstances changed again in 1842, shortly after Lord Palmerston was 
replaced by Lord Aberdeen as Foreign Secretary. 
77 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.  
78 This reliance on small and fast sailing vessels continued at least until the early 1850s, when 
slave traders decided to start using larger, merchant-looking vessels to carry out their slaves 
to Cuba. 
79 Chapelle, The Baltimore Clipper. Large steam vessels were popular again during the late 
1850s and early 1860s. See Murray, Odious Commerce, p. 308. 
80 The average tonnage for the previous period (1820-1834) was of 159.2 tons. Slavevoyages. 
http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces (accessed 8 October 2015).  
81 Zeuske and Garca Martnez, ÔLa Amistad,Õ p. 224. A study of where slave vessels were 
built during this period is still wanting. 
82 Chapelle, The Baltimore Clipper, p. 108.  
83 Schenley and Madden to Admiral Sir P. Halkett. Havana, 11 October 1836. TNA: Foreign 
Office 84/197, f. 215. 
84 Matson to Sir George Cockburn. 8 January 1844. In Matson, Remarks, p. 70. 
85 Schenley and Madden to Admiral Halkett. Havana, 11 October 1836. TNA: Foreign Office 
84/197, ffs. 215-5v. 
86 Extract of a Letter, dated Rio Nuez, 24 August 1836. HCPP. 1837 [001] Class A. 
Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, Havana, Rio de Janeiro and 
Surinam, relating to the slave trade, f. 7. 
87 Schenley and Madden to Palmerston. Havana, 25 October 1836. HCPP. 1837 [001] Class 
A. Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, Havana, Rio de Janeiro 
and Surinam, relating to the slave trade, f. 191. 
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88 Eltis, Economic Growth, p. 136. See also the tonnage figures from Slavevoyages for the 
periods 1820-34, 1835-50, and 1851-66. 
89 Joseph T. Crawford and Francis Lousada to the Earl of Malmesbury. Havana, 26 February 
1858. HCPP: 1859 Session 2 [2569] Class A. Correspondence with the British 
commissioners at Sierra Leone, Havana, the Cape of Good Hope, and Loanda; and reports 
from British Vice-Admiralty Courts, and from British naval officers, relating to the slave 
trade from April 1, 1858 to March 31, 1859; f. 17. 
90 Crawford to Malmesbury. Havana, 25 January 1859. TNA: Foreign Office 84/1073, ffs. 
21-8v. 
91 See graph on Eltis, Economic Growth, p. 100.  
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